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commentary by
Michael L. Bromley |
Bromleyisms
... of Automobiles
... and Politics
...and of history, of society, and a whole lot more.
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... of Politics
Last August (see Bromleyisms 8/19/06 here), Freeman reported on the growth of auto making in the South. The article claimed that Detroit's intractable problems have yielded to globalism's deep reach into Tennessee, Mississippi, Kentucky, South Carolina, Georgia, and Ohio, where Japanese, Korean, and German auto plants have set glad homesteads. (Note the neat little assumption here that those problems of Detroit ought to be solved by public policy.) One would think, Freeman writes, that Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander would take a more pro-American view of automobiles, what with his anti-flag-burning and English-only stances. But whatever the irony Freeman sees in Senator Alexander's support for productive factories in his own state, the Senator's position is far more pro-American than that of the UAW, which would impose European labor rules upon all those new auto plants -- none of which are unionized. From this latest from Freeman, one would think that the UAW has been unfairly banned from the foreign-owned factories of Tennessee and elsewhere. To repeat from the above excerpt, Freeman writes:
A little history, if you please: The UAW damned well succeeded in organizing a foreign-owned U.S. auto plant -- and damned well brought the project down. In large part in reaction to the threat of UAW-sponsored import limits, Volkswagen in the late 1970s decided to manufacture the new "Rabbit" in the U.S. (The high cost of the German Mark was a major factor here, too, as were new EPA, NHTSA, and other 1970s regs that set U.S.-only standards). With good German management-labor-government attitude, VW went headlong into labor agreements with the UAW. Rebellion, poor-work, and assorted other by-products of guaranteed employment took hold immediately, and the U.S. Rabbit became problematic at best, and doomed.* Meanwhile, the UAW attempted to secure its hold on the U.S. automobile by pushing through Congress import quotas. The Japanese reaction was as planned: build in the U.S. and Canada. Only, the Japanese resisted unionization. After six years of warfare, the UAW finally gave up on unionizing the Honda plant in Ohio, and other attempts at collective bargaining at Toyota and other plants similarly failed. Led by adept U.S. managers, the Japanese averted the UAW trap -- and have so to date. In Freemn''s August/2006 article, one of the few mentions of the UAW regards the Union's chief lobbyist, one of the Reuther clan, who blamed the group's failures at southern plans on the Republican Congress. Now that the Dems are back, clearly hopes are up. They ought not be too hopeful. The UAW first unionized this highest-paying of major industries through coercion, violence, and other abuses of property and contract law. It was only through government endorsement of unionization and its illegal strikes that the UAW succeeded in forcing Detroit into the closed shop. Those laws and those officials who might support illegal strikes are no more. Look for less unionization in Detroit, especially with the new
Chrysler and GM and Ford restructuring, and not more collective bargaining in
the foreign-owned plants. Freeman is sympathetic to the efforts, otherwise the
article would have emphasized not the need for unionization but it's futility
and detrimental consequence upon American-owned automobile manufacture. *Note: see this article on the VW experience with the UAW
and the growth of non-union plants in by Philip Mattera published by a leftist
non-profit that is dedicated to "aid activism": Mattera says that the non-union southern strategy is "not a low-wage model," and he recognizes that the workers are "satisfied with their working conditions." But, he concludes that this attitude will change and these plants will face problems of their own. He even suggests that without pressure from the unions, the factories will lower wages, which is nothing more than a backhanded argument for union intervention. The article does give a balanced view of the VW experience and the new Southern plans, however, the author misses the key ingredient in the success of the non-union work force in the absence of that most insidious element a union brings: forced collective bargaining. Once workers lose voice with their employers -- giving it over to the union bosses -- they lose voice in the workplace --and care. The edge of individual worker responsibility is core to the success of the non-union plants.
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